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LAW UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION:




This chapter is written in the spirit of Judith's scholarship and style of inquiry. It 
endeavours to provoke discussion; it is polemical but also indicates the manner in 
which strong argument might be supported by measured research; it is written in 
a spirit of rationalism and is against the forces of irrationalism, especially as they 
undermine the interests of two vulnerable groups: women who wish to terminate a 
pregnancy and those who are extremely ill and wish to end their lives. Its arguments 
and concerns have an international reach. It takes on a large subject, which ultimately 
affects us all. And it employs a slightly experimental approach, as Judith has done in 
her own work.
In 'An Alien's Encounter with the Law of Armed Conflict', Judith responded 
creatively to a request to characterise the law of armed conflict in terms of the sex of 
its subjects.1 She supplied an account of this body of law from the point of view 
of an alien, trying to make sense of these regulations as if they were the rules of a 
ghastly game, but without prior knowledge of their purposes or intended subjects. 
1 In Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (LBC Information Services 
and Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) 233.
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What would this creature from another world make of the people conjured up by 
these rules? Judith thus disclosed the presuppositions and biases of humanitarian law, 
and its understandings of its male and female subjects: the dominant male players, or 
combatants, with their natural affinity for arms and their peculiar codes of honour, 
and the preyed-upon female players, beings of natural modesty and weakness.
My chapter borrows from Judith and her exercise with the alien. It creates 
two distinct viewing points from which to examine afresh another body of law: the 
medico-legal rules governing basic birth and death decisions. From quite a high perch 
(though perhaps not from the great heights of the alien),2 I examine the broad 
diplomatic and rhetorical moves and strategies of the main protagonists in the legal/
religious debates which have shaped these laws. I consider also how these protagonists 
have themselves manipulated and played with perspective and point of view in order 
to achieve their ends. I then propose a shift of observational position to allow a 
close-up scrutiny of the disputants and their specific practical tactics: of the religious, 
who seek to control these decisions, and of the secular legal liberals, who respond to 
the religious with laws of compromise.
introduCtion
Why conduct this exercise? Why revisit the great debates between the religious and 
the secular legal? One of the most pressing national and international concerns 
of the new century is the strengthening of religion, as a social and political force, 
and its movement into the public sphere.3 And yet the institutional effects of this 
religious flourishing are poorly understood.4 This is especially true of the institutions 
of law, which are a major target of religious organisations.5 Conservative elements 
of a variety of proselytising Christian Churches in Australia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States share a pronounced interest in certain basic life and death 
matters.6 Their representatives often proclaim in public forums on the morality of 
contraception and abortion, assisted reproduction, the use of embryos and organs, 
pregnant women's refusal of medical treatment, the formation of intimate union and 
2 Though Judith breathed life into the alien and so its eyes were really hers on planet Earth.
3 AC Grayling, Towards the Light: The Story of the Struggles for Liberty and Rights that Made the Modern 
West (Bloomsbury, 2007).
4 Marion Maddox, 'An Argument for More, Not Less, Religion in Australian Politics' (2009) 22(3) 
Australian Religious Studies Review 345-67.
5 Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson (eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical Context 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6 Ngaire Naffine 'Varieties of Religious Intolerance' (2006) 8 University of Technology Sydney Law 
Review 103-17; 'Law's Sacred and Secular Subjects' in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson 
(eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical Context (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 268.
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the positive ending of life, especially euthanasia.7 Such religious interest groups also 
endeavour to influence directly the content and direction of relevant law, so that it 
marries with theological doctrine.8 For example, they may seek leave to intervene 
in law cases dealing with matters of their concern, or make submissions to relevant 
government inquiries into law reform.
As and when such religiously sensitive matters are formally translated into 
legal norms, and so enter the realm of law, the responsible legal officials are likely 
to be placed under a variety of intellectual, political, social and moral strains. These 
strains may occur as the law is being developed and formulated or when the resulting 
doctrine is applied and requires interpretation. There may be pressures to supply both 
legal and moral justifications; to exercise diplomacy to avoid offence to the religious 
and the secular, without straying too far from accepted legal principles. The result is 
a mixed body of law often marked by conceptual tension.9
This chapter comes in two parts. The first part ascends to a high perch and 
endeavours to discern the broad forms and character of the debate between the legal 
and the religious communities, especially in relation to birth and death decisions, 
and reflects on the reasons that legal officials have found themselves so vulnerable 
to the claims of the religious within these debates. This, I suggest, tends to be bad 
for women and bad for the vulnerable more generally. The second part changes the 
viewing position: it urges a move to the detailed, the technical and the practical. It 
proposes a programme of close research into the particular ways law has specifically 
responded to such religious pressure: when and how it has resisted such pressure 
and when and how it has succumbed. The avowed purpose of such an inquiry is to 
improve our legal understanding of the nature and extent of the imprint of religion 
on law and thus equip law better to resist religion.
thE CanoniCaL dEbatE — how thE rELiGious and thE LEGaL 
CommunitiEs tEnd to EnGaGE with onE anothEr on thE biG issuEs
The moral, political and legal terrains of abortion and euthanasia are important meeting 
grounds of the religious and the secular. There are highly public and well-rehearsed 
7 David Marr, The High Price of Heaven (Allen and Unwin, 2000); John Portmann, Sex and Heaven: 
Catholics in Bed and at Prayer (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
8 D Eisenberg, 'Lessons of the Schiavo Battle: What the Bitter Fight over a Woman's Right to Die 
Tells Us about Politics, Religion, the Courts and Life Itself' Time, 4 April 2005, 21.
9 Jane Weaver, 'Court Ordered Caesarean Sections' in Andrew Bainham, Shelley Day Schlater and 
Martin Richards (eds), Body Law and Laws (Hart Publishing, 2002) 229; Emily Jackson, Regulating 
Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart Publishing, 2001); Emily Jackson, Fatemeh Ebtehaj, 




moral and legal debates between the religious believer and the secular liberal, which 
tend to be cast in a certain manner: as a struggle between two oppositional principles 
— the sanctity of human life versus the autonomy of the human individual — and 
those principles are linked with fundamentally different systems of thought. This 
canonical debate between the religious and the secular on the appropriate mode of 
regulating the fundamental life matters of abortion and euthanasia is typically cast 
as one of 'pro-life' versus 'pro-choice'. By way of this shorthand, the sanctity of the 
life of the foetus is pitted against the reproductive autonomy of the pregnant woman, 
and the sanctity of the life of the suffering person is pitted against their preference for 
their life to end.
The believer advances the principle of the sanctity of human life and argues 
that it should directly sound in law such that, for example, abortion should be fully 
criminalised and euthanasia should remain the crime of murder. The foetus and the 
adult at death's door are said to have ineliminable value; they are sacred and inviolable; 
nothing and no-one should deliberately harm them or end their life.10 The secular 
liberal argues that choice should reside with the rational chooser: with the woman 
who may or may not wish to reproduce and with the person who wishes to die.11
This debate is conventionally portrayed as one of stark oppositional disagreement 
between those of fundamentally different, even incommensurable, worldviews or 
mentalities or ways of seeing. Repeatedly, it is stated that the disagreements between 
the religious 'pro-life' view and the secular liberal 'pro-choice' position are intractable; 
that they entail fundamentally different comprehensive systems of thought; that 
controversy and hence regulative difficulty is inevitable. For example, a general review 
of Australian efforts to decriminalise euthanasia described the 'euthanasia debate' as 
'indeterminable and intractable' and as 'a controversial subject on which many people 
hold strong views'.12 Similarly, the debate about the regulation of reproduction has 
been described as one of 'profound moral disagreement about the propriety of human 
intervention', such that 'there will … never be consensus about the moral status of 
10 See, for example, the extensive writings of John Finnis on this subject, especially 'The Legal Status 
of the Unborn Baby' (1992) 43 Catholic Medical Quarterly 5-11; 'Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?' (1993) 
109 Law Quarterly Review 329-37; 'A Philosophical Case against Euthanasia' in John Keown (ed), 
Euthanasia: Ethical, Legal and Clinical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 32; 'Euthanasia, 
Morality, and Law' (1996) 31 Loy. LA Law Review 1123, 1143; 'Public Reason, Abortion and Cloning' 
(1998) Valparaiso University Law Review 32; 'Abortion, Natural Law and Public Reason' in Robert P 
George and Christopher Wolfe (eds), Natural Law and Public Reason (Georgetown University Press, 
2000) 71-105.
11 The most prominent liberal in this area is Ronald Dworkin; see especially his Life's Dominion: An 
Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (Harper Collins, 1993) 82-3; and 'Tyranny at the Two Edges 
of Life: A Liberal View' (Winter 1994) New Perspectives Quarterly 16, 19.
12 Lorana Bartels and Margaret Otlowski, 'A Right to Die? Euthanasia and the Law in Australia' 
(2010) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 532, 550.
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the foetus'.13 '[T]he predominant construction of the issue of abortion regulation' 
has also been described 'as an irresolvable conflict between a foetal right to life and a 
maternal right to privacy or bodily autonomy'.14
Because of this seemingly dug-in oppositional stance, it is often said that legal 
development, legal reasoning and analysis in this field are inherently hard work, legal 
principles strained and compromised, and consensual law making impossible.15 To 
Emily Jackson, for example, 'in working out how to regulate abortion, pursuit of 
a compromise that reaches even a minimal level of universal acceptability is almost 
certainly futile'.16 This canonical debate is, in essence, a particular (Christian) religious 
view pitted against a secular liberal view, and — incidentally and importantly — it is 
the preferred orthodox Roman Catholic method of framing the debate, as opposed 
to that of religious liberals.17
Why and how does the debate continue to be cast and recast in these stark 
terms?18 What work is being done by this casting or framing of the debate, and what 
does it leave in place, uninspected and unresolved? And most importantly, perhaps, 
what are its utilities and its disutilities — especially for pregnant women and the 
dying? Here my intention is to observe, from a high perch, the large moves of the 
protagonists and their manipulation and negotiation of perspective.
Declaring Incommensurable Visions: The Duck/Rabbit
Something that is exceedingly confusing about the big debates on abortion and 
euthanasia is that, starkly drawn as they are (typically said to be) in their canonical 
forms, both debates seem to entail an assertion of incommensurable ways of seeing 
the relevant subjects and their regulation and even the source of law; and such 
incommensurability would seem to suggest that conversation or negotiation is 
impossible. It is said repeatedly that the conflicts are irresolvable, but, as we know, 
conversation does occur. After all, it is a debate — one of the biggest and best known.
13 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction (Hart Publishing, 2001) 1.
14 Charlotte Lesslie, 'The Psychiatric Masquerade' (2010) 18 Feminist Legal Studies 1, 3.
15 See Ngaire Naffine, 'How Religion Constrains Choice' in Paul Babie and Neville Rochow (eds), 
Freedom of Religion under Bills of Rights (University of Adelaide Press, 2012).
16 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction (Hart Publishing, 2001) 1.
17 Of course, the Christian Church also encompasses moderates, liberals and the truly ecumenical. 
There are many tolerant liberal Christians who do not cast the debate in such stark oppositional terms. 
Such religious tolerance is particularly evident in the work of liberal Australian Christian ethicist Max 
Charlesworth. See, for example, his Bioethics in a Liberal Society (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
18 Even by feminists, such as Jackson and Lesslie.
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Though the form in which this debate is cast, between the religious and the 
secular, is one of complete conflict, it contains paradoxical elements of agreement 
and bipartisanship. These elements of agreement have important utilities for those 
on both side of the divide, but they are particularly beneficial to the religious, as 
they entail such large concessions. The form, I suggest, in which the debate is cast 
is very like that of the duck/rabbit made famous by Wittgenstein. The duck/rabbit 
is a perceptual puzzle which enables two fundamentally and incommensurable ways 
of seeing the one object, both of which cannot exist at the same time. Wittgenstein 
employed the duck/rabbit to demonstrate that we see the one object (here the one 
human being) 'according to an interpretation', and that we can see it as entirely 
different objects.19 If we employ the idea of the duck/rabbit here, one way of seeing is 
religious — call it the rabbit; the other way of seeing is that of the secular liberal — 
call this the duck. The two visions, the rabbit (the religious view) and the duck (the 
secular liberal view) are irreconcilable: they are two utterly different views or systems 
of thought which result in entirely different ways of seeing what is there. In a sense, 
the seeing produces a completely different object or subject.
If and while you see it one way, you cannot see it the other way. Thus when 
it comes to seeing the pregnant woman, a strong religious 'rabbit' way of seeing her 
(from the moment of the fertilisation of her egg) is as the bearer of her own and 
another's soul, a sacred innocent being of unalloyed value who must be protected 
from intentional killing at all costs. Now she is not one, but two, and now she may 
represent the greatest threat to the embryonic soul. There is a Divine Supernatural 
source of the value of both. By contrast, a strong secular liberal 'duck' way of seeing 
the pregnant woman is as one being: one rational human individual who is the 
woman and the only responsible chooser. Now human value derives from human 
reason and there is no such thing as the Divine. These are incommensurable ways of 
seeing the same human being.
With the sick or dying person who positively wishes to hasten death, the 
religious view is that the only relevant will is the perceived will of God. The religious 
view invokes a higher law than human law. For the secular liberal, the relevant will is 
that of the dying person whose life it is. With the debate thus starkly drawn, entailing 
utterly different visions, we seem to be at an impasse.
The duck/rabbit is the extreme and yet common cast of the debate. This is 
how the debate is typically described: as entailing incommensurable ways of seeing 
the problem which cannot be held simultaneously. This necessarily means that, at any 
given moment, either the rabbit or the duck must trump — we cannot have both, 
or a mix of the two. It can only be the rabbit (say, the soul/life of the foetus, which is 
19 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1953) 200.
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infinitely precious and must not be intentionally killed) or the duck (say, the woman 
as human chooser, as sovereign controller of her body). Binocular vision cannot be 
achieved. Resolution is impossible. The religious faithful will see only the twin souls 
of the pregnant woman, and the secular rationalist will see no soul at all: only a 
single human rational chooser. Thus cast, we have non-negotiability of position and 
so intransigence.
However, this cast of the debate, which I suggest is the received one, also has 
a number of important paradoxical implications and effects. The duck/rabbit cast 
of the debate entails a basic concession by rationalists to those on the other side of 
the debate — that is, the rationalists concede that the religious adherents genuinely, 
absolutely see the matter differently, for reasons which must be respected. It can also 
connote that the image or meaning is in the eye of the beholder and that neither the 
duck nor the rabbit are right or wrong:20 it is a matter of perception.21
Secular rationalists may thus concede too much from the outset. They concede 
the supposed difficulty of the subject matter — after all, it is a duck/rabbit. They 
concede that it is useless to argue in duck terms to the rabbit people. They may 
further agree not to argue the nature of the problem because the two understandings 
are fundamentally incompatible.
The secular rationalist will speak of the importance of the choice of the individual 
but also, in a spirit of compromise, of the inherent value of the individual, regardless 
of the individual's ability to make rational choices. Legal liberals are unlikely to 
challenge directly what are taken by the religious to be supernatural truths. There may 
even be a judicial or scholarly recognition that what once had a Biblical justification 
(say, the principle of the sanctity of life) now has a secular justification (humanism). 
But judges and law makers and even legal scholars are reluctant to go further and say, 
in true atheistic humanistic spirit, that there is no basis for belief in God and that 
its tenets can be positively harmful. Direct, and one could say intellectually honest, 
confrontation is avoided. Respect and restraint and even solicitude may be displayed. 
Deep and true differences are veiled.
Indeed, as one skeptical commentator has observed, 'religious tolerance is 
largely a creature of secular humanism, and in its spirit the majority of critics manqué 
20 The rabbit people will not concede this among themselves because, after all, they see a rabbit and 
take the rabbit to be the position.
21 It is not the essential or true nature of the object or human being which is being seen and described 
by the duck people or the rabbit people (whatever that may be), but an interpretation of that object or 
being; however, that interpretation is so compelling and critical to the particular worldview that it is 




have simply declined to fire'.22 Thus secular rationalists, in liberal spirit, out of respect 
for the religious, often decline to criticise the contents of religious belief; and, indeed, 
some have treated such belief as intellectually respectable and have been willing to 
draw upon it when the need is thought to arise.
Concession that Legal Resolution Will Be Hard or even Impossible
The duck/rabbit casting of the debate can also entail a declaration by law makers and 
lawyers that in these areas of legal life there can be no real resolution; those of belief 
will simply not see it the same way as the secular; these differences of seeing necessarily 
put the matters in the 'hard basket'; they are inherently difficult or tricky matters, 
which will inevitably produce hard cases for law. They must be bracketed from the 
mainstream of good, sound, principled law. Law cannot make them different. They 
will remain legally difficult and probably unsatisfactory, but that is just how things 
are. These are the matters that will be non-standard, exceptional, at the penumbra of 
legal meaning. And thus they will not threaten the core of legal meaning or represent 
a test of it. Strategically, the duck/rabbit is important. It says that what might appear 
to be a legal or political compromise or failure actually resides in the different ways of 
seeing the problem, which will not and cannot change.
Parcelling Out the Problem
This cast of the debate can entail the further implication that the religious-rabbit 
cast of the debate might be right in some circumstances (entailing a concession to 
religious moral authority) while the secular-duck cast might be right in others. This is 
what Stephen Jay Gould has referred to as 'non-overlapping and thus non-competing 
magisteria, where a magisterium is "a domain where one form of teaching holds the 
tools for meaningful discourse and resolution"'.23 This can conduce to a parcelling 
and division of the problem, so that the religious get some bits of law while the 
secular get others. If we look very briefly at the resultant law, one could conclude 
that euthanasia has been given over to the religious, while the formally criminal, but 
practically liberal, law of abortion remains somewhere between magisteria; neither 
rabbit nor duck; neither fish nor fowl.24
22 Tamas Pataki, Against Religion (Scribe Short Books, Melbourne, 2007) 11.
23 Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul (Basic Books, 2002), quoting Jay Gould in Rock of Ages: 
Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (Ballatine Books, 1999) 47.
24 In those Australian jurisdictions (such as Victoria) where early-term abortion has been 
decriminalised, it would seem that the secular-duck position has prevailed.
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The duck/rabbit cast of the debate draws attention away from the compromises 
of secular liberalism, where it is willing for autonomy not to be fully applied, despite 
the presence of a rational chooser: where liberals begin to exceptionalise and even 
move towards mysticism and begin to concede the special mysterious nature of that 
which must be regulated.
Thus the duck/rabbit is an extreme cast of the debate which is widely accepted 
and has a number of practical and strategic implications and utilities. It licenses 
ongoing negotiations about who is going to control meaning (and the law). Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the duck/rabbit cast of the debate deflects attention 
away from the terms, concepts and meanings that the two sides share. There is a 
great deal of bipartisan thinking which tends not to be openly discussed, evaluated 
or criticised.
The Common Measure: The Content of the Agreement
I now want to consider more closely just what the two sides have in common. First, 
the inevitability of a two-sex system as a basic ordering category of social and legal 
thought is fundamentally agreed.25 The distinction between man and woman is 
utterly assumed and shared, even though there are differences in the conception of 
each. Both sides share a history in which the personification of women is qualified. 
Certainly, the problems in conceiving of women as sovereign individuals whose 
symbolic meaning does not derive from man are shared. Both sides assume some sort 
of reciprocity of the sexes.26 For both, men (understood in a certain manner) remain 
the true unproblematic individuals.27
Second, both accept a bodily form in which this individual value is 
uncompromised (the non-pregnant healthy individual). Both have a sense of 
25 For a sustained analysis of the two-sex system in law, see Katherine O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions 
of Law (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985). See also Margaret Davies, 'Taking the Inside Out: Sex and 
Gender in the Legal Subject' in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary J Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law 
(Sweet and Maxwell, 1997).
26 According to the Catholic Catechism: 'God himself is the author of marriage' and marriage is to 
be between one man and one woman. Here the guiding idea is that the sexes have a correlative nature. 
Rather than functioning as distinct choosing individuals, forming intimate associations unrelated to 
our sex, we are expected to form intimate relations only across the sexes and then, ideally, to reproduce 
naturally and so produce a family. In other words, there is a wholesome honourable God-given form 
to the heterosexual family. It is paradoxically both the natural and required unit of being: the man, his 
woman and their offspring. Catechism of the Catholic Church (Society of St Paul, 1994), par 1603.
27 On the difficulties of accounting for women as true legal individuals, see Ngaire Naffine, 'Our 
Legal Lives as Men, Women and Persons' (2004) 24 Legal Studies 621.
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'physical completeness'.28 The problematic or marginal status of the pregnant woman 
is common to each ordering system: the pregnant woman poses a fundamental 
categorical problem to both religion and law.29 However, the system of thought is not 
shaken by this problem of ordering.30
The very sick and the dying person are also problematic to both. Both the 
religious and the secular rationalist question the autonomy rights of the dying person, 
though on different grounds. The secular rationalist, with their idea of a competent 
autonomous bounded individual, divines the loss of these qualities in the dying and 
begins to question their ability to function as choosing individuals; the religious 
person looks to God's will for the appropriate source of decision making.
There are agreements between Christian theology and Liberal philosophy 
on principle and conceptual division, and there are bipartisan agreements about 
how power should be shared in law. When a person unproblematically satisfies the 
requirements of the liberal individual, as an autonomous discrete rational chooser, 
there is no quarrel with the religious: the person is governed by the autonomy 
principle, and law supports their choices without interference from religion. When a 
person is pregnant or dying and religion acquires an interest, liberal philosophy tends 
to retreat and begins to cede authority to the Church. The preconditions of liberal 
individualism are no longer clearly satisfied; religion acquires a stake and is positively 
permitted to do so.
It can often appear that law is striving valiantly to reach a regulative 
compromise, to find points of common agreement within a pluralistic society31 
comprising groups with very different worldviews (and doing so badly, according to 
cogent feminist critiques): 'to reconcile the inevitable conflicts inherent in pluralism 
and liberal democracy'.32 But I suggest that law is not a sort of neutral external 
28 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) 64. See also the extensive 
feminist literature on the 'bounded' nature of the human body in law, especially the work of Jennifer 
Nedelsky.
29 See Mary Ford, 'A Property Model of Pregnancy' (2005) 1 International Journal of Law in Context 
261; and 'Evans v United Kingdom: What Implications for the Jurisprudence of Pregnancy?' (2008) 8(1) 
Human Rights Law Review 171.
30 Rather, the problem is found to lie with that which does not fit the order — with the pregnant 
woman herself.
31 As Peter Cane expounds this view of law: 'Law can underwrite value-pluralism. If disagreements 
about values become so serious that they threaten social stability and harmony, the law may be able to 
maintain social cohesion by laying down a norm that people are prepared to accept'. Peter Cane, 'Taking 
Law Seriously: Starting Points of the Hart/Devlin Debate' (2006) 10 The Journal of Ethics 21, 49.
32 This was how the Lockhart Committee inquiry into the regulation of human cloning conceived its 
task. Loane Skene et al, 'The Lockhart Committee: Developing Policy through Commitment to Moral 
Values, Community and Democratic Processes' (2008) 16 Journal of Law and Medicine 132, 134.
253
IMAGINING LAW
umpire arbitrating fundamental differences across comprehensive systems of belief. 
Law does not stand outside these two ways of seeing, impartially parcelling out 
competing claims. Rather, law is deeply implicated in both ways of thinking, and 
thus plays an important role in shoring up both positions. What we have is a law of 
compromise: both the competing views find their way into law, thereby setting up 
tensions within law as well as silent agreements about terms, principles and divisions 
— the uninspected. Law is fully implicated.
The conceptual divisions I have identified are reflected in law. The conceptual 
machinery that is already in place in law, particularly its basic divisions, has been 
developed in a certain religious climate by people of influence within that culture 
according to their understandings. Religion and then political liberalism have been 
strong twin conditioning influences on the development and hence the nature of 
those divisions. One can say that these twin influences have helped to establish basic 
conceptual legal divisions imbued with particular metaphysical understandings which 
work poorly for reproducing women and for the weak and dying.
The perceived strength of this dichotomous casting of the problem — the 
duck/rabbit — arises because both religion and secular political liberalism reach 
into, and connect with, law's general principles and its very conceptual foundations. 
Consequently, law does not stand above these metaphysical debates, as dispassionate 
arbiter between antagonists; nor does law exist in its own distinctively legal domain, 
unaffected by the ideas which are promulgated on both sides. Instead, I suggest, law 
is deeply implicated in both ways of thinking. Thus it helps to sustain the debate: it 
helps to reproduce it, to give it legal meaning, to give it practical legal work to do, 
and indeed to generate the tensions and create the very intellectual problems it strives 
to solve. Because of this deep implication of law in both ways of thinking, law itself 
is often confusing and confused, and the subject matters come to seem to be hard 
areas of regulation.
The Making of Hard Cases (which Serve the Directly Affected Poorly)
A number of things follow from this analysis. The canonical debate between supposed 
opposites — the religious and the secular liberal — is misleading because in truth it 
is founded on a broad base of agreement. Because this broad base is agreed, much of 
it goes uninspected. And yet it is here in the conceptual foundations that some of the 
most troubling elements of each position reside, notably the problematic status of the 
protagonists of both debates: pregnant women and the dying. The practical result is 
that both are the chief subjects of concern and yet both are poorly conceptualised in 
the prevailing systems of belief. This helps neither subject to get justice through law 
because law helps to reproduce each position with all its contradictions.
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Another concerning effect of the strong oppositional nature of the received 
debate is that law making in these areas occurs in its shadow. Indeed, legal officials are 
often acutely aware of these religious debates and of the religiously sensitive nature of 
certain legal issues, and so their reasoning is developed with a sly eye to these debates, 
especially when it seems that they are moving into religious territory. The canonical 
debate causes law makers and judicial officials to tread carefully. These are the subjects 
of conscience votes rather than clearly developed public policy, and they result in law 
which has been heavily criticised for its failure to address fully the concerns of either 
side. Legal officials may also begin to adopt metaphysical and theological thinking 
themselves, to stray into the discourse of the other, to the extent that they come to 
conceive their task as religious in nature and as touching on the very meaning of life.
Indeed, the great debate appears to produce a law of compromise, but not 
in the best political sense of that term, nor as a law that comports with justice. 
Abortion laws have typically entailed the use of criminal law — that is, the setting up 
of a serious criminal offence — and have then supplied what is effectively a medical 
defence of necessity if the woman can establish the threat that the pregnancy poses 
to her health. Formally, the choice to terminate resides with the doctor, not with the 
woman. Only very recently have a few Australian jurisdictions removed abortion 
from the criminal law. At the end of life, withdrawal of life support in hopeless cases 
is lawful (effectively making lawful slow death by dehydration) as is the doctrine of 
double effect, but voluntary euthanasia remains murder. Repeated attempts to make 
euthanasia lawful have failed. In both cases, the vulnerable person, who is either the 
pregnant woman or the dying person, is deprived of individual choice, and religious 
principles are imposed on the secular.
Feminists, for some time now, have noted the exceptionalising and bracketing 
of normal female conditions in law making and legal analysis. Indeed, this could 
be said to be the most important proposition of feminists: that women still do not 
represent the human norm (though feminists have also questioned the very idea of 
such a norm). Pregnant women, in particular, have been construed as hard cases for 
both liberal legal individualists and for the religious, who have such an interest in the 
twin souls they are thought to represent. They have therefore often been treated as 
hard legal cases calling for exceptional legal treatment.33
The pregnant woman is wrenched between belief systems and represents a 
problematic case for both. As the subject of religious discourse, she finds that she 
bears a sacred foetus. To the extent that law subscribes to the same way of thinking 
and invokes the religious-legal principle of the sanctity of life, she will find that she 
33 See, for example, Mary Ford, 'A Property Model of Pregnancy' (2005) 1 International Journal of 
Law in Context 261.
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cannot therefore terminate a pregnancy, unless her own wellbeing is threatened. Thus 
a termination remains a serious criminal offence, but there is a defence of necessity 
supplied to her doctor.34 As subject of the secular liberal discourse, the pregnant 
woman may find that she is effectively not pregnant at all. She is an autonomous 
individual whose rights as a choice maker are undiminished by her pregnancy. 
Alternatively, she may find that she is not regarded as eligible for the status of rational 
choice maker because this implicitly calls for non-pregnant status. In short, she does 
not qualify as a liberal individual.
The dying are more obviously the subjects of religious thinking. The religious 
view gives them a soul that is God's, which is something that neither they nor the 
doctors have the right to destroy. The liberal secular view endows them with choice. 
Law resolves the difference with the doctrine of double effect and the criminalisation 
of voluntary euthanasia.
The duck/rabbit cast of the great debates is subtle, confusing and conducive to 
spin. It enables sophisticated and tactical disagreement and a good deal of unstated 
and unquestioned agreement. My practical concern, however, is with the people who 
are caught up in these great debates where there is so much smoke and mirrors, 
particularly pregnant women and the sick and dying — people at their most vulnerable 
times — and the laws they get left with and the manner in which their lives are 
regulated as a consequence. My concern is that religious principles, in particular, are 
being imposed on the secular in order to limit both reproductive autonomy and the 
way that we are permitted to die.
a rEsEarCh ProGrammE
Thus far, I have examined the broad terms and casting of the debate between the 
religious and the legal from a high perch. But such general observations would gain 
strength from a sustained and rigorous investigation into the specific and particular 
ways in which religion has pressed on to law and the ways in which law has differentially 
responded. This would be the work of a major investigation, which is badly needed in 
view of the rising forces of religion. Within the brief of this chapter, my task is only 
to sketch out a programme of research, not to undertake it.
34 Feminists have been especially critical of the medicalisation of women in abortion law and the 
denial of their right to decide what is done with their bodies — a right asserted as fundamental to 
liberalism in the classic statement by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty (1869). If anything, in abortion 
law, autonomy rights reside with the doctor rather than with the woman. See especially Sally Sheldon, 
Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law (Pluto, 1997); Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: 
Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart Publishing, 2001); Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2009) and Jackson, Ebtehaj, Richards and Sclater, above n 9.
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The programme I propose is one that examines critically just how, why and 
when legal officials have asserted their disciplinary autonomy, their conceptual 
authority and competence, over the intimate life matters, and eschewed religious 
influence; how, when and why they have struck a regulative compromise with the 
religious; and when and why they have been positively receptive to religious influence 
and even ceded moral and legal authority to the Church. In short, what makes 
for a willingness of law's representatives to join forces with religion? And when is 
disciplinary separation more likely to be asserted, and what sort of laws and law 
result?
The project would examine the interplay between religion and law, with a 
particular emphasis on the legal institutional responses: the effects on legal principle, 
concepts and doctrine and, perhaps most importantly, on how the task and role 
of the legal official is conceived by that official. This calls for close legal analysis 
of the complex diplomatic negotiations between religious and legal officials, as 
representatives of two disciplinary positions in which a law of cross-disciplinary 
compromise is often achieved.
The potential scope of this inquiry is considerable and so to secure its 
intellectual boundaries and establish a sensible framework for specific investigation 
it would take as its focus certain laws and certain forms of law making in particular 
jurisdictions. The legal world that forms the focus of this project would be that of 
modern centralised Anglo-American-Australasian state law. The scope of the project 
would be further delimited by the choice of legal subject matter.
The two major life decisions which could sensibly form the substantive legal 
subject matter of this project are, first, the decision to start a life (and conversely to 
stop life starting), and second, the decision to end a life (and conversely to demand its 
continuation). As I have already observed, birth and death are parts of life, and their 
associated decisions are subject to legal regulation, over which the Church asserts its 
particular competence and authority, and with which it is particularly exercised. They 
relate to important parts of Christian theology. In these parts of life, the religious 
story is particularly rich.35 The case and statute law pertaining to these life decisions 
could therefore supply an excellent source of material about relations between law 
and religion.
A cluster of laws regulating the start of life attracts the interest of the Church. 
They include laws governing contraception, abortion, assisted reproduction, the 
rights of pregnant women in relation to refusal of medical treatment, sterilisation 
35 This has been noted by Ian McEwan in 'End of the World Blues' in Christopher Hitchens (ed), The 
Portable Atheist (Da Capo Press, 2007).
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of the disabled, and the uses of embryos produced by assisted reproduction. These 
religiously sensitive areas of law are particularly marked by their conceptual tensions.
There is another cluster of laws concerning dying and death which attract the 
interest of the religious and aspects of which seem to reflect religious understandings. 
The courts have openly endorsed a common law principle of the sanctity of human 
life (a direct borrowing of religious language): voluntary euthanasia remains murder 
and assisted suicide a separate serious crime. However, there is also to be found in 
these areas of law a jurisprudence of compromise which acknowledges the autonomy 
rights of the individual to issue directives, in advance of their dying, for medical 
support to be discontinued.
These complex relations between law and religion are conducted within 
government inquiries into law, in the parliament and its associated processes, in the 
courts and on the Bench, at the highest judicial levels, and also in legal scholarship in 
learned journals and monographs. These are the sources upon which this project could 
rely. There should be a selection of superior court decisions related to these religiously 
sensitive matters of making and ending life. The point of these case analyses would 
not be to labour or rehearse the religious nature of these matters. Rather, their point 
would be to reveal the techniques employed to justify, deflect or deny the recognition 
of religious arguments and interpretations. There could also be a close study of a 
selection of reports of government inquiries on religiously sensitive matters which 
anticipate changes to legislation in the two areas and the means adopted to engage 
with and bypass moral/religious inquiry.36 Again, the point would be, first, to show 
the techniques of engagement with religious representatives and second, to explore 
the legal mechanisms of compromise.
This inquiry would shed new light on the very nature of law as it absorbs 
religious pressures and is constitutionally altered in complex ways that are, to date, 
poorly understood. It would show how law both changes and sustains its very nature, 
as a discipline, as it assimilates strong pressures from another discipline. It would 
36 The project could consider, for example, Mary Warnock's report of the government inquiry 
into the regulation of human fertilisation and embryology (Mary Warnock, A Question of Life: The 
Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Basil Blackwell, 1985); the Lockhart report 
on the regulation of human cloning: Loane Skene, Ian Kerridge, Barry Marshall, Pamela McCombe 
and Peter Schofield, 'The Lockhart Committee: Developing Policy Through Commitment to Moral 
Values, Community and Democratic Processes' (2008) 16(1) Journal of Law and Medicine 132; 
and the Nuffield Council of Bioethics' Working Party on Human Bodies in Medicine and Research 
chaired by Marilyn Strathern, published on the Council's site: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Working 
Party on Human Bodies in Medicine and Research, Give and Take? Human Bodies in Medicine 
and Research: Consultation Paper (April 2010) <http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/
Human-bodies-in-medicine-and-research-consultation-paper.pdf>. These critical analyses of the 




explain the fundamental tensions that are generated within law as it confronts a 
profoundly different discipline (which is, at least in part, incommensurable with law, 
due to its reliance on faith rather than reason), and the means by which those tensions 
are accommodated, resolved, deflected or ignored. Such a study would greatly deepen 
our understanding of law's intellectual responses to religious pressure, and of the 
fundamental tensions which ensue within jurisprudence. It might well also show the 
way to a more coherent, more intelligible more principled and hence more just law 
governing the decisions which are most basic to our lives.
There is already solid preliminary evidence of three broad legal institutional 
responses to religiously sensitive matters, and these support the formulation of 
a strong hypothesis that could guide such an investigation.37 Perhaps the most 
orthodox institutional response to religion is legalistic in nature, in that the sensitive 
matter needing regulation is treated as assimilable to, and appropriately governed by, 
existing conventional legal principles, concepts and reasoning. It entails an assertion 
of disciplinary autonomy and the invocation of distinctively legal concepts, principles 
and purposes to preserve that autonomy. This is a jurisprudential assertion of both 
law's separability and of its actual separation from other bodies of knowledge and 
thought, and it is likely to entail explicit opposition to religious intervention and 
a refusal to treat the sensitive matter as exceptional. It entails an assertion of full 
disciplinary competence and resistance to religious argument and metaphysical 
speculation. There may also be a tendency to emphasise the abstract, inventive and 
artificial nature of law. In this mode, law is often turned in on itself, mainly addressed 
to legal officials, committed to a technical language often not intended for general 
understanding, relatively autonomous, non-naturalistic, and increasingly statutory.
The second, less influential but still manifest, legal response to religion is 
effectively its polar opposite: it entails an explicit legal receptivity to religious argument, 
deference to the authority of the religious and possibly a legal 'exceptionalising' of the 
religiously sensitive matter, so that it is treated as a special case in need of extra-legal 
reasoning and principles. This is a jurisprudence which comes close to a variety of 
religious law. It occurs when legal officials profess that law has exceeded its conceptual 
competence, that the matter to be regulated is not fully susceptible to legal treatment 
and hence that there is a ceding of moral and legal authority to the Church and a 
merging of law with religion. Here, there is a tendency to see law as continuous with 
a natural or supernatural morality outside of law, and so to import metaphysical 
understandings into law (such as what is the value and meaning of a life) and also to 
37 See Ngaire Naffine, Law's Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (Hart 




regard the religious as expert in these areas. In its starkest mode, it entails a surrender 
of disciplinary autonomy.38
The third response seems to entail a pragmatic middle position, an endeavour 
to juggle legal and religious principles, to defer to and respect both, and even to 
hold the two in balance. Such reasoning is evident in a good deal of the case law 
on beginning and end of life decision making. This involves a complex exercise in 
legal diplomacy in an area where competing views can be strongly articulated and 
potentially legally destabilising, and where there are high levels of public scrutiny. 
It entails concessions to the disciplinary authority of the Church, but for certain 
supposedly metaphysical purposes only, and then not completely so. It invokes a mix 
of orthodox legal and religious principle.
Here we see legal officials partly engaged in a process of compromise, 
acknowledging the strain between religious and legal principle, but still asserting the 
importance or even priority of distinctively legal principles and methods. This response 
entails a departure from legalism and so a change of law's artificial character, such that 
the sense of law's abstracting and inventive quality is modified and diminished. This 
is a law of practical compromise, strategically addressed both to the religious as well 
as to the legal and broader community.39
While preliminary inquiry strongly suggests the presence of these three legal 
responses to religion, more sustained investigation may well reveal greater complexity 
of disciplinary response and overlapping positions, and indeed it may identify other 
disciplinary positions. The full range and complexity of institutional legal responses 
to religion need to be closely examined and tested for their relative influence, their 
precise nature, their interplay, and the manner in which they shape legal doctrine. For 
each legal response, one can anticipate a particular and distinctive understanding of 
the general nature and role of law, the specific nature of the legal task, the sufficiency 
of legal concepts, and the suitability of intervention by religious representatives and 
religious principle in legal matters.
The project should pose a variety of questions designed to probe the nature 
of the legal response to religious intervention. For example, how does the official 
construe the nature of the problem or dispute before it? Is the problem cast in an 
assiduously legal manner, focusing on the specific purposes of the governing laws and 
the consequent legal rights and duties thus arising, or is it interpreted in a manner 
which admits metaphysical arguments? Is it treated as a central, standard case for 
38 See, for example, the writings in these areas of Leon Kass, John Keown and John Finnis.
39 For example, there was close public scrutiny of the decisions of the English Court of Appeal in the 
case of A Children [2004] 4 All ER 148 (on the legality of separating conjoined twins, thereby killing one 
of them), and the Law Lords engaged in extensive highly public justifications of their reasoning, which 
appealed to a broad variety of positions.
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which there are apposite principles, or as exceptional? Does the official assert full 
disciplinary competence or concede the relevance of religious argument? Is there a 
conscious use of legal techniques such as presumptions, fictions and deemings, or 
abstract rights analysis, to thereby circumvent moral categorisation and metaphysics? 
Is expressive moral/religious language employed or avoided? The use of the term 
'sanctity of life', for example, is highly expressive and bears religious connotations. Is 
standing granted to religious bodies in the relevant cases? If so, first, on what basis is 
it granted (why are they seen to have a material interest)? Second, how does the court 
interpret and respond to their arguments?
The project should examine the ways in which religion influences law making 
and legal interpretation. The strong guiding hypothesis is that there are three 
distinct jurisprudential responses to religion: one legalist, another religionist and a 
third pragmatic. Sources should be investigated and tested for the presence of these 
responses. However, investigation should remain open to the possibilities of other 
more complex relationships between law and religion. The anticipated benefit of 
such a programme of research is a more reflective law, which is either less vulnerable 
to metaphysics (especially theology) or which employs metaphysics consciously and 
strategically and in conformity with the needs of justice.
aftErword
The manipulation of perspective is a useful heuristic technique. As Judith found with 
her alien's view of humanitarian law, it can offer a new way of seeing something that 
has become too readily accepted, or that is seen in a standard way, because of excessive 
familiarity. It can jolt one out of easy assumptions.
With the great religious and legal debates about the making and ending of life, 
there has been a standard set of arguments and counterarguments; my aim has been 
to expose and evaluate these practised moral and intellectual manoeuvres. From my 
high perch, I have observed the large moves of the players within this moral and legal 
game as it is played over and again. I have then suggested how we might move closer 
in on the disputants and work out what is going on in greater detail, with a finer 
focus. But the project proposed is not for the faint-hearted. It is still large in scale and 
it is riven with contention: the practised players are very likely to want to exert their 
effects and to press us into all the old moves.
